Gorillas in the House of Light by Ashford, DM
 
Gorillas in the House of Light 
 
David Ashford 
 
[First published in Cambridge Quarterly, 2011] 
 
 
Five shuffle past a plate-glass door. Two men in coats. A family of three: a small girl topped with a 
knitted hat pulled along by her father and mother. They pass through a dark space of curving metal 
out into the light. A guard stoops to unlatch and seal the doors shut. In the next shot, a sheer glass-
front onto something that might be a laboratory, or an observatory: a ceiling in motion, rapidly 
sweeping about to flood the white space and reflective surface of the glass-screen with sun. The eye 
can make nothing of this. Nothing is substantial, nothing is still. Some futurist fantasy of a vast and 
abstract mechanism for the movement of shadow and light. Both building and a machine. But what? 
– the roof and wall fully retract to reveal a colossal cage. Mok and Moina are kept here: the baby 
gorillas at London Zoo. Face pressed to the bars and chicken-wire, one of the infants looks up to the 
right, the concrete-wall curling about to enclose him. In winter the House is shut – public in one 
half, apes in the other. In summer the cage is revolved and the glass-screen pulled back – the infant 
gorillas occupying the complete circle, while the public watches from without.  
 
In this motion picture by Lazlo Moholy-Nagy, The New Architecture and the London Zoo (1936), 
the Gorilla House at London Zoo, by Berthold Lubetkin’s firm Tecton, is hailed as the beginning of 
a new era, ushered in by the use of reinforced concrete.1 And zoo-enclosures were a significant 
milestone for the modernist movement. For most of those working-class Londoners who flocked to 
see the gorilla-children in their new home, this was their first encounter with the new architecture. 
Built at a time when the works of the modernist mainstream, centred in Paris, remained for the most 
part on the drawing board, the Gorilla House, with subsequent enclosures by Tecton in London, 
Dudley and Whipsnade, was perceived to be providing a sane blueprint for the future development 
of the human metropolis. In fact, the project can be interpreted as a form of animal-testing. As 
science-historian Peder Anker has noted, Peter Chalmers-Mitchell, secretary of the Zoological 
Society, believed that if gorillas and penguins could be shown to thrive in ‘the most unnatural 
conditions’ the same would hold for the poor, who were in desperate need of being liberated from 
their “natural” conditions of criminal and filthy slums. ‘It was thus of revolutionary importance to 
display thriving animals in an unnatural setting as if to prove that humans too could prosper in a 
                                                 
1 Lazlo Moholy-Nagy, The New Architecture and London Zoo (1936), Museum of Modern Art Film Library.  
new environment’.2 Following wide-spread ruin in the course of the Blitz, this ambition would at 
last be realised, as the architect Lubetkin began to apply the modernist architecture he had 
pioneered at London Zoo to the problem of mass-housing. The kernel of that future city we now 
inhabit is this Le Corbusian machine for habitation in London Zoo. This first House of Light.  
 
The fate of the infant gorillas therefore holds peculiar horror. After six months in their new home 
Mok and Moina were dead; their bodies subjected to a Persian funeral, put in a cage on a roof in the 
sun, to be picked clean by carrion-crow.3 The tussle over where to assign blame – to poor 
maintenance or to poor design – to owner or to architect – must now seem an ironic foreshadowing 
of the argument that would rage, in subsequent decades, over modernist mass-housing in the UK. I 
wish to explore the possibility that the gorillas in their House of Light were not the victims of an 
oversight, as the architect maintained, but of a terrible mistake in the Cartesian philosophy 
underpinning modernist thought. I suggest that in addition to representing a turning-point for 
modernism, the Gorilla House occupies an important place in the crisis in humanism identified by 
Jacques Derrida. The gorilla can be seen to have possessed extraordinary resonance in the early 
twentieth century; a symbol for a crisis of faith in the Cartesian definition of the human being. 
 
In The Animal That Therefore I Am (2007) Derrida set out to track the systematic relegation of the 
Animal in western philosophy back to the theoretical break initiated by Descartes; the stark binary 
that defines the human by corralling every other species on the planet into a single concept, under a 
single name, “The Animal”.4 This consistent characterisation of the Animal as that which is 
deprived of the Logos, the right and power to respond, is the root of the misery inflicted on other 
animal species by humans, or on other humans unfortunate enough to have themselves been marked 
out as “Animal”. The Gorillas in the House of Light represent the culmination of this Enlightenment 
reduction of the Animal: the subject is held in a fearsome geometry, a lyrical celebration of human 
reason. But this extremity is also a symptom of societal unease – an anthropocentric reinstitution of 
the superiority of the Human over the Animal that testifies to the panic generated by ‘humanity’s 
second trauma’: evolution – the knowledge that mankind is intimately involved in everything that 
he had for so long tried to disavow as other, as Animal.  
 
But what did Rene Descartes actually say, and in what way does his theoretical formulation of the 
human-animal binary differ from the earlier idea stretching right back to Aristotle that man is an 
                                                 
2 Peder Anker, ‘The Bauhaus of Nature’, Modernism/Modernity, Vol.12, No.2, p-.239. 
3  Berthold Lubetkin, Notes for ‘Samizdat’, p.40. RIBA, Lubetkin’s Papers, Box 1, LuB/25/4. 
4 Jacques Derrida, The Animal That Therefore I Am, ed. Marie-Louise Mallet, trans. David Wills (New York: Fordham 
University Press, 2008), p.32. 
animal distinguished from the rest by his capacity for rational thought: the Rational Animal? As 
Derrida points out, Descartes is a man in a hurry, compelled to eliminate everything that is not 
certain and indubitable. Here is the passage in the Meditations in which Descartes called time on the 
earlier definition: 
 
 What, then, did I formerly think I was? I thought I was a man. But what is a man? Shall I 
 say rational animal? No indeed: for it would be necessary next to inquire what is meant by 
 animal, and what by rational, and, in this way, from one single question, we would fall 
 unwittingly into an infinite number of others, more difficult and awkward than the first, and 
 I would not wish to waste the little time and leisure remaining to me by using it to unravel 
 subtleties of this kind.5 
 
To arrive at what “I am” it is necessary to begin by dismissing the concept of the rational animal. 
This frees Descartes to reach a new formulation in Discourse on Method – “I think therefore I am”.6 
On first impression, this might seem to be merely reasserting the idea that man's defining 
characteristic is reason: I think – I have the capacity for rational thought. But what must follow? I 
am a Man? No. I think therefore I AM. Something truly radical has taken place here in relation to 
that earlier tradition; a moment of rupture that has had profound implications for humanity's 
relationship to the Animal. In a startling move the capacity for rational thought has been equated 
with Being itself, with the very Name of God.  
 
Previous philosophers had insisted that the animal lacked reason, though Aristotle, for instance, 
clearly believed that humans and animals shared much else. Certain animals possessed qualities 
nearly akin to those common to mankind in greater or less measure: “For just as we pointed out 
resemblances in the physical organs, so in a number of animals we observe gentleness and 
fierceness, mildness or cross-temper, courage or timidity, fear or confidence, high spirits or low 
cunning, and with regard to intelligence, something akin to sagacity.”7 In contrast, the new means 
for defining the essence of what it is to be human cut us off from animals in the world, and from 
everything that is animal in our own selves. “But I, who am certain that I am, do not yet know 
clearly enough what I am; so that henceforth I must take great care not imprudently to take some 
other object for myself, and thus avoid going astray in this knowledge which I maintain to be more 
                                                 
5 Rene Descartes, Discourse on Method and Other Writings, trans. F.E. Sutcliffe (London: Penguin, 1968), pp.103-
104. 
6 Ibid., p.53.  
7 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, I.13. 
certain and evident than all I have had hitherto.8 To this end Descartes abstracted from the “I am” 
his own living body, which is presented objectively as a machine or corpse: “I considered myself, 
firstly, as having a face, hands, arms, and the whole machine made up of flesh and bones, such as it 
appears in a corpse and which I designated by the name of body”.9 In short, he is a “thing that 
thinks”.10 And anything lacking the capacity for rational thought is nothing more than a machine, is 
empty of the living Name of God. The Animal is therefore, in a sense, unreal: no longer capable of a 
meaningful response – of saying “I am”.  
 
In order to illustrate this point, Descartes presents us with a famous allegory that curiously 
anticipates the science-fiction of Philip K. Dick. Imagine a future in which man has never seen an 
animal. Imagine man has created a machine that precisely simulated the appearance, movement and 
sound of an irrational animal.11 According to Descartes, one could not distinguish between real and 
simulated animal, because there would be no fundamental difference. But no one could make such a 
mistake if confronted with a clockwork man, and this is because the human being is capable of 
responding in intelligent fashion to any questions put to him. 
 
 And this shows not only that animals have less reason than men, but that they have none 
 at all; for we see that very little of it is required in order to be able to speak; and since one 
 notices inequality among animals of the same species as well as among men, and that some 
 are easier to train than others, it is unbelievable that the most perfect monkey or parrot of its 
 species should not equal in this the most stupid, or at least a child with a disturbed brain, 
 unless their souls were not of an altogether different nature from our own.12  
 
The discovery of the Gorilla in the nineteenth century posed a challenge to this classic thought-
experiment, presenting new possibilities that were to prove profoundly unsettling to the hard-and-
fast categories of humanist thought. The earliest specimens (a skull and other bones) were obtained 
by the American physician and missionary Thomas Staughton Savage in Liberia, and presented to 
the scientific community as Troglodytes Gorilla in Proceedings of the Boston Society of Natural 
History in 1847.13 The first part of the name simply means cave-dweller but the second part is 
derived from a mysterious word that occurs in the Periplus of Hanno the Navigator; – a Greek 
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translation of a Punic account of a voyage along the coast of West Africa in the fifth century BCE.14 
After cataloguing the fauna and prominent landmarks encountered (a mountain of the gods, a river 
of fire pouring into the sea), Hanno speaks of a skirmish between the Carthagenians and a tribe of 
hairy folk:   
 
 By flame for three days to South Horn, the bayou, 
 the island of folk hairy and savage 
 whom our Lixtae said were Gorillas. 
 We cd. not take any man, but three of their women. 
 Their men clomb up the crags, 
 Rained stone, but we took three women 
 who bit, scratched, wd. not follow their takers. 
 Killed, flayed, brought back their pelts into Carthage. 
 Went no further that voyage, 
  as were at end of provisions.15 
 
Neither Greek nor Punic, the word gorilla might be related to gorku, the Fulani word for man, the 
diminutive form of which is gorel.16 But it is impossible to be sure if the gorilla should be identified 
as a forgotten breed of hominid or with the species later designated as such. In any event, this name 
proved an inspired choice; with its echo of a remote, mythical past, gorilla fired the imagination, 
initiating a rush for specimens, on the part of museums across the world.  
 
The first stuffed gorillas were displayed in Paris in 1852. The explorer Paul du Chaillu became the 
first western-man to see a living gorilla on his expedition of 1856-59, and brought the first dead 
specimen to England in 1861.17 But in spite of the mounting interest provoked by these scientific 
discoveries, which only intensified following publication of Charles Darwin's theory of evolution in 
1859, no systematic field-study took place before the second quarter of the twentieth century, when 
the American Museum of Natural History sent Carl Akeley to secure specimens for the collection.18 
For over seventy years the term gorilla would mark, no less than it had in the time of Hanno, the 
point at which knowledge failed, the edge of uncharted territory – a space for speculation and for 
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18   An expedition later recounted by mystery writer Mary Bradley in On the Gorilla Trail (New York: Appleton, 1922). 
doubt.  
 
First, and perhaps most unsettling, of the new monsters to emerge from this vanishing point, is the 
sculpture Gorilla Dragging Away a Dead Negress (1859) by Emmanuel Fremiert. In this colossal 
image there is none of the twisted eroticism that hindsight might lead us to expect in this the first 
representation of that now familiar trope of the gorilla and the girl. Crushed tight by a huge stubby 
hand, the woman's face and body are pressed into the flabby bulk of a female gorilla; a big hoop 
swings from the ear beneath an elaborate head dress; the robes are heavy, funereal; the arm let 
swing is not that of some sylph from the Salon but muscular; the fingers a taut claw; no poetry, no 
glamour; a real corpse. The gorilla's face is a blank – fixed snarl – but the eyes are sad. Surging 
forward, the gorilla is an unstoppable force bearing the away the dead. But it is impossible to read 
reasons or circumstances into this sombre tableau. The piece possesses a mystery that is profoundly 
troubling; something terrible has taken place, something on a mythical order, not spelt out. 
Exhibited in the same year that saw the publication of the Origin of Species, it is little wonder that 
the Paris Salon refused to exhibit the piece, only consenting to do so on the condition that the 
gorilla was screened by a curtain; or that they should have hastened to have had the sculpture 
destroyed after the exhibition. The gorilla entered the art of the west freighted with humanity's 
second trauma, hauling off the shell of what was once thought to be the image of God.  
 
Fremiet's next treatment of the motif greatly refined the gorilla's symbolic potential. His Gorilla 
Carrying Off a Woman of 1887 won the Paris Salon Medal of Honour, and the Republic approved a 
bronze reproduction edition that proved highly popular.19 This is rather a curious reversal, since this 
image is more sensational than the first. Once again a gorilla is pulling away a woman, tucked tight 
under biceps – but the woman is beating and pushing the monster, her breasts crushed big against 
the ape, her thighs behind soft and full; embodying a sensuality in shocking juxtaposition with an 
immense knot of bone and muscle and hair; no uncertainty, no ambiguity as to intent; an alpha-male 
gorilla in heat; hefting a sharp-edged rock, screaming through a mouthful of fang. But in some 
respects this image is safer, though more explicit, rather more conventional, than the group of 1859. 
The original was shocking because Fremiet had chosen to adopt a style that drew upon his training 
as an illustrator at the Parisian Museum of Natural History. Stiffly respectable, rigorously 
researched and anatomically correct, best remembered for the Terrible Lizards that roam through 
Crystal Palace Park – that stocky mid-Victorian Naturalism which had become inextricably 
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identified with scientific veracity. In contrast, the later Gorilla is in a style more in keeping with the 
aesthetic of the Paris Salon. The woman is now Caucasian, the scene is of no particular time or 
place but is set in some mythical past. The sculpture could be taken as a modern recapitulation of 
the Centauromachy – an allegory in classical art, expressing humanity's struggle to overcome the 
irrational or animal. The motif had been reconfigured as a conflict – the outcome of which was far 
from as clear cut as might initially appear.  
 
Fremiet’s iconic revision of the Gorilla and the Girl is recapitulated with remarkably little 
elaboration in the scores of gorilla-related horrormovies that were produced in the early twentieth 
century. One recent survey indicates that one hundred films with gorillas were made between 1908 
and 1948 and of these the vast majority were horrors. 20 Most of the gorillas in the genre were 
played by men in gorilla-costumes – a dedicated band of professional ape-impersonators, often 
taking their passion for realism to alarming lengths. If no one has heard of Charlie Gemora, the 
Master of the Art, in part this is because this remarkable actor would insist on having his name 
removed from the credits in order to maintain the realism of the production. The maker of his own 
gorilla-suit, and the sculptor of the gigantic hand that reaches into a hotel-room to snatch Fay Wray 
in King Kong (1933), Charlie Gemora was the leading figure in a genre that testifies to the 
tremendous unease that surrounded these recently discovered creatures in the public mind, 
rehearsing the psychopathologies the collapsing Cartesian paradigm had generated beneath the 
veneer of twentieth-century culture; often with surprising sensitivity and sophistication.  
 
The motif of the gorilla and the girl, repeated ad infinitum in these films, owed its popularity to the 
fact that it successfully channelled as yet vague new fears into a familiar and  therefore reassuring 
template: the conflict between Man and his Inner Animal. This fact is nowhere clearer than in 
Edward D. Wood Jnr’s sole contribution to the genre – his brilliantly twisted script for Bride and 
the Beast (1958), in which a couple have their wedding-night disturbed by the violent bull-gorilla 
that the husband, Dan, keeps locked up in a dungeon (complete with flaming torches) underneath 
the house. The gorilla is called Spanky, and Dan is not a little disturbed to discover that his new 
wife (played by Charlotte Austin), who insists on sleeping in a separate bed to her husband, 
smoulders with a sexual intensity rarely caught on celluloid whenever in the presence of the gorilla. 
A jealous Dan shoots Spanky dead, and Charlotte Austin is subjected to hypnotherapy and regressed 
to a past life, in which she was an albino gorilla. Readers who have seen Tim Burton's wonderful 
biopic Ed Wood (1994), will have no difficulty in recognising the confession that emerges in the 
course of the hypnosis as an expression of the director's own unconventional sexual drives: “Soft 
like kitten's fur”, says Charlotte Austin, recalling her former pelt. “Felt so good on me.”21 Though 
rather more candid in this respect than most, the process of projection crystallised in this particular 
gorilla-movie is a characteristic feature of a genre that could have been invented for the sole 
purpose of illustrating the psychoanalytical interpretation of animal-phobia developed earlier in the 
century by Sigmund Freud. In short, this is the theory that sexual desires deemed abhorrent by the 
father, together with hatred of the father provoked by that repression, are displaced onto an Animal. 
“By wild-beasts the dream-work usually symbolises passionate impulses,” Freud explains; “those of 
the dreamer, and also those of other persons of whom the dreamer is afraid; or thus, by means of a 
very slight displacement, the persons who experience those passions”.22 In fact, Freud's thoughts on 
this topic seem eerily prescient, when one remembers that so many gorillas in these movies are 
treated precisely as a totem-animal: “From [the dream] it is not very far to the totemistic 
representation of the dreaded father by means of vicious animals, dogs, wild horses, etc. One might 
say that wild-beasts serve to represent the libido, feared by the ego, and combated by repression.”23      
 
‘The conflict between Man and his Inner Animal’: this is clearly how many engaging with the trope 
of the gorilla at the time explained the motif themselves. Consider Aldous Huxley's satirical 
representation of the American film-industry in Ape and Essence (1948). Huxley picks up on the 
recurring imagery of the ape in films produced in this era, and incorporates this into a meta-fictional 
film-script discovered by an exploratory expedition sent to a Hollywood destroyed by nuclear war. 
In the following passage the Freudian-Darwinian understanding of the horror of the ape outlined 
above is presented as self-evident:  
 
 Surely it's obvious . 
 Doesn't every schoolboy know it? 
 Ends are ape-chosen; only the means are man's . . .  
 Church and State, 
 Greed and Hate: – 
 Two Baboon-Persons in one Supreme Gorilla.24  
 
But there is a problem with this psychoanalytical approach. The Animal itself is entirely eliminated 
from the equation. The specific horror of the ape is neutralised in the moment of its expression. In 
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22 Sigmund Freud, The Interpretation of Dreams (1913), trans. A.A. Brill (London: Wordsworth Classics, 1997), p.270.  
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becoming a sign for the “bestial” – the term which most accurately describes the horror of what you 
see in these movies – the gorilla has become a symbol of something from which beasts are exempt 
by definition. As Derrida has observed, “One cannot speak ... of the bêtise or bestiality of an animal. 
It would be an anthropomorphic projection of something that remains the preserve of man”.25 In 
presenting the gorilla as a symbol of the Inner Animal, movie-makers and writers were re-enacting 
the disavowal of something intrinsically human. The gorilla is reduced to an empty sign, 
interchangeable with any other animal species in a structure of meaning that is the product of that 
sign-making power thought proper to man. These motion pictures ultimately reassert the 
problematic Cartesian formulation of the Human subject and the Animal object. 
 
But is the gorilla interchangeable with any other species? It is true every creature imaginable has at 
some point or another been rendered an object of horror by the film-industry; there have been birds, 
there have been sharks, there have even been killer shrews. In any number of gorilla horrormovies, 
from Bela Lugosi's Murders in the Rue Morgue (1932) to Acquanetta's Captive Wild Women (1943) 
the horror of the ape can be seen to derive not merely from its role as a symbol, one among many, 
for the depredations of the sub-conscious mind, but from the fact that the gorilla was perceived to 
be the embodiment of the challenge that the great apes posed to the thought-experiment set out in 
the Discourse on Method. Descartes asserted that the machine or animal would always be 
recognised as such by us because the animal-machine could not respond, and because an intelligent 
response could not be simulated. But could the Logos be Aped?  
 
In The Descent of Man (1871), Charles Darwin had remarked that: “It is not the mere power of 
articulation that distinguishes man from other animals, for as everyone knows, parrots can talk; but 
it is his large power of connecting definite sounds with definite ideas”.26 But having clearly 
signalled his engagement in this way with Cartesian Thought, Darwin then observed that this is an 
Art and therefore achieved through imitation: “As bearing on the subject of imitation, the strong 
tendency in our nearest allies, the monkeys, in microcephalous idiots, and in the barbarous races of 
mankind, to imitate whatever they hear deserves notice”.27 If those dull, stupid men mentioned by 
Descartes could be conflated in this way with mere monkeys and said to be entirely capable of the 
mimicry that permitted language, what might happen when explorers eventually discovered the 
“perfect ape”?28 Could we count on our ability to tell the simulation or aping of a response by this 
sophisticated animal-machine from the real thing? 
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 One should bear in mind just how little was known concerning gorillas in this period. No one yet 
knew what feats these beasts were capable of – and for the vast majority of people in the thirties and 
forties the Gorilla was, of course, a man in a costume called Charlie Gemora! – It is possible that 
the gorilla horror-movies of the period played no small part in exacerbating anxieties that sustained 
them, presenting their uninformed audiences with preternaturally intelligent gorilla-men. 
 
The nature of this anxiety emerges particularly clearly in what must be the original ape-related 
horror story, and primary prototype for the genre considered above, The Murders in the Rue Morgue 
(1841) by Edgar Allan Poe. The unsettling effect of the story stems in large part from the fact that 
the sleuth Dupin refers to the deaths in the Rue Morgue as “murders” after he has utterly eliminated 
the possibility that the perpetrator could be human: “In the manner of thrusting the corpse up the 
chimney, you will admit that there was something excessively outre – something altogether 
irreconcilable with our common notions of human action, even when we suppose the actors the 
most depraved of men”.29 The narrator confesses to feeling “a creeping of the flesh” on hearing 
Dupin's summary of the case; and one can understand why, when one appreciates that a murder that 
represents a “horror absolutely alien from humanity” necessarily involves a paradox.30 For as Will 
Smith observes in I, Robot (2004), only a human can be guilty of homicide – a restatement of the 
familiar Cartesian conflation of the human being with the capacity for rational judgement. It is 
significant that when the narrator speculates “A madman ... has done this deed – some raving 
maniac, escaped from a neighbouring Maison de Santé”, Dupin concedes that the “idea is not 
irrelevant”.31 Presumably the idea is not irrelevant because a madman would not have been tried for 
a murder in any court. In solving the “murders” in the Rue Morgue, Dupin discovers that no murder 
took place – and so no one is charged for this offence at the end. Because the perpetrator is an ape. 
Not a gorilla – the mystery was published six years before the scientific discovery of that species – 
but a “large fulvous Ourang-Outang of the East Indian Islands”.32 The violent deaths were not 
murder, but the result of the mechanical imitation believed to be proper to an ape – aping a man 
shaving – followed by violent reaction to a sudden fright. Poe has presented the reader with the 
perfect simulation of a crime by an animal lacking capacity for rational thought: the most intelligent 
men on the Parisian police-force have been shown to have failed that test upon which Descartes had 
grounded his case for setting human beings apart from animal-machines; they have been shown to 
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be incapable of distinguishing the illusion of the Logos from the real thing. Nor, one should point 
out, is the effect of Dupin's intervention exactly to restore these imperilled boundaries. In his 
famous preface, Poe explains that the purpose of the narrative is to provide a commentary on his 
proposition there is a hitherto unrecognised distinction between ingenuity and analysis. “The 
consecutive or combining power, by which ingenuity is usually manifested, and to which the 
phrenologists (I believe erroneously) have assigned a separate organ, supposing it a primitive 
faculty, has been so frequently seen in those whose intellect bordered otherwise upon idiocy, as to 
have attracted general observations among writers on morals”.33 Against the ingenuity of a retentive 
memory and of playing by the book, Poe sets up the analysis that he characterises as the very soul 
and essence of method; “it is in matters beyond the limits of mere rule that the skill of the analyst is 
evinced”.34 The narrative presents a very clear difference between the acumen of Dupin and the 
mere cunning of the Prefect of Police. But it is hard to say how one can distinguish the cunning 
exhibited by the Parisian Police from the cunning exhibited – to rather more effect! – by the 
Ourang-Outang. In each case, cunning is based on a retentive memory and the capacity for 
repeating certain procedures in a mechanical, unreflective way. Perhaps the most terrifying element 
in this landmark horror story is a variation on the familiar Cartesian distinction between response 
and reaction that puts most of humanity beyond the pale, with little or nothing to distinguish the 
“ingenuity” of which they boast from the “cunning” of the merely animal.   
 
The full implications of this impending ontological crisis are set out in Pierre Boulle's novel La 
Planète des Singes (1963). The film-adaptation, Planet of the Apes (1968) significantly revised the 
plot of Boulle's novel in order to present a timely satire on the “bestiality” of mankind, merely 
reconfirming the Cartesian Human-Animal binary in the act of inverting it. The book is very 
different. Everything horrific in the novel stems from the fact that for the most part everyday life is 
pure “reaction” rather than “response” – and can therefore be aped. It is in this traditional belief that 
it is the capacity for imitation that is characteristic of the ape that the specific anxieties that became 
attached to the new anthropoid apes, and the unfortunate gorilla in particular, are to be found. In 
these passages from La Planète des Singes you have fully realised the horror of the ape.   
 
 What is it that characterizes a civilisation? Is it the exceptional genius? No, it is everyday 
 life. ... Is it possible that creatures devoid of intelligence could have perpetuated it by a 
 simple process of imitation? ... This should be able to be achieved by monkeys, who are 
 essentially imitators, provided of course they are able to make use of language. ... At the 
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 level of administration, the quality of aping seemed even easier to admit. To continue our 
 system, the gorillas would merely have to imitate certain attitudes and deliver a few 
 harangues, all based on the same model.35 
 
Charlie Gemora would have instantly recognised the compositional elements in the Gorilla House at 
London Zoo. The ‘intrinsic human ceremony’ enacted by a porch ushering the public into a dark 
theatre.36 And that sliding panel – like the false-walls that conceal Spanky's dungeon, or that of Bela 
Lugosi in The Ape-Man (1943), or like the curtains that screen King Kong, or Fremiet's first Gorilla. 
Everything in the approach to the building worked toward a particular theatrical effect. The big 
reveal of a horror intended to figure the spectator’s own primitive drives – suddenly there and held 
in a spotlight. If the Gorilla House presents certain strong similarities to the Cabinet of Dr Caligari, 
the laboratory of the Mad Scientist, this is perhaps no coincidence. For there is evidence to suggest 
that Lubetkin may have been inspired in his design by the same sources. “There are two possible 
methods of approach to the problem of zoo design”, explained Lubetkin; “the first, which we may 
call the 'naturalistic' method, is typified in the Hamburg and Paris zoos, where an attempt is made, 
as far as possible, to reproduce the natural habitat of each animal; the second approach, which, for 
want of a better word, we may call the ‘geometric’, consists of designing architectural settings for 
the animals in such a way as to present them dramatically to the public, in an atmosphere 
comparable to that of a circus.”37 Lubetkin was committed to ensuring his enclosures drew upon 
traditional spaces of popular entertainment. His elephant-paddock at Whipsnade Zoo emulates a Big 
Top, for instance. The famous Penguin Pool at London Zoo resembles a Lido. And, perhaps most 
troubling, his pit for the Polar Bears at Dudley Zoo can only have been modelled on the Elizabethan 
Bear-Pit – a vertical tube in which bears were set upon by dogs for the amusement of the public. In 
the light of this commitment it seems at least highly probable that Lubetkin's first structure for 
London Zoo should be based upon the platform for the popular exhibition of the gorilla referenced 
by so much cinema of the period. That is to say, the freak-show at a circus or fairground. 
 
This was not lost on contemporary critics. An American critic for instance argued that the modernist 
projects at London Zoo had the “flavor of a circus or a country carnival” for the “pure pleasure and 
amusement of their owner” with the result being that “the educational or scientific value of an 
English zoo is nearly zero”.38 In a recent article surveying the legacy of Bauhaus ideas in the UK, 
science-historian Peder Anker cites this passage, and explains that this interpretation of the project 
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(that is to say, the architect's own understanding of his zoo buildings) can only obscure the very real 
scientific objectives that the management at London Zoo hoped to achieve through commissioning 
these new buildings. “Though they welcomed entertainment that could generate general interest in 
biology (and money from entrance fees), they were not willing to pursue amusement at the expense 
of their scientific integrity”, insists Anker. “It was the promotion of public health and not 
amusement which prompted the Zoo keepers to build modernist architecture.” His subsequent 
emphasis on the discourse of the “healthy environment”, shared by Zoo keepers, newspapers and 
architects alike, is entirely correct, and the article as a whole, extremely illuminating. But I would 
like to suggest that Lubetkin's conception of nature as a circus for human entertainment was not 
incompatible with at least one key scientific and educational objective of the London Zoological 
Society's research anatomist, Solly Zuckerman, who played a major role in securing the commission 
for Tecton.  
 
For much of his life, Zuckerman saw himself as engaged in unrelenting struggle against the cardinal 
error of inferring that “comparison of animal and human social life will enable us to discover some 
of the basic instincts and impulses upon which the whole edifice of human society is reared”39. It is 
true that Zuckerman believed the life of primates to be a crude picture of a social level from which 
our earliest human ancestors emerged: “But”, Zuckerman immediately goes on to say, “only that”.40 
Contrary to Anker's assertion, his landmark thesis on primate behaviour, The Social Life of Monkeys 
and Apes (1932), does not present this material as a model for explaining deeper sexual and social 
instincts in humans. “Indeed much could be said for divorcing the study of man's behaviour from 
that of other animals in relation to the subject matter of sociological discussion”.41 It is explained 
that “[w]hen the impetus given to biological inquiry by Darwin's exposition of the evolutionary 
hypothesis made them prominent subjects for discussion, both these aspects of mammalian 
behaviour were at first considered together, and there accumulated a wealth of literature to fill the 
Cartesian gulf separating man from the beasts, and proving the continuity of mind and society 
through the world of living organisms”.42 Thus Kropotkin's Mutual Aid (1919) examined organised 
social groups in the animal kingdom to prove that progress is best fostered by the practice of mutual 
co-operation and support.43 E. Westermarck's The History of Human Marriage (1921) provided an 
anecdotal account of the “family group” of the gorilla, in order to establish a natural basis for the 
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human institution of marriage.44 And Yerkes and Yerkes had taken certain facts about a New World 
monkey to indicate “a species of communism” as being “of the utmost importance to mankind”.  45 
Zuckerman casts a caustic eye on that “somewhat surprising discovery of politico-economic 
systems at a biological level in which work and production, in the economic sense, can hardly be 
thought of as existing”.46 He proceeds to point out that the mating habits of even closely aligned 
species like spotted deer and red deer can differ enormously: “it is even more misleading to attempt 
to infer the mating habits of the first men from those of the gorilla or any other sub-human 
primate”.47 The Social Life of Monkeys and Apes would take a very different approach and signalled 
this intent on the very first page, which opens by quoting Hoppius, a naturalist of the eighteenth 
century, who advised posterity that “it would lead not a little to Philosophy, if one were to spend a 
day” with apes “exploring how far human wit exceeds theirs, what distance lies between Brutish 
and rational discrimination”.48 The book that follows is very much in keeping with these “Cartesian 
principles”, providing an epoch-making account of the atrocities that took place on Monkey Hill 
between 1925 and 1930. “It is in their demonstration of the ways in which human social behaviour 
has renounced its biological background that studies of Old World apes and monkeys have greatest 
significance”, Zuckerman later explained, in his article on “The Biological Background of Human 
Social Behaviour” (1937); “Such studies do not indicate fundamental limiting factors in primate 
social expressions, but they show the full extent to which human behaviour has altered in the course 
of human evolution”.49 The sexual violence inflicted on the living and the dead on Monkey Hill 
should most certainly not be read, it is implied, in order to gain an insight into what we are as a 
species – and one suspects that the often gruesome details in Zuckerman's account were intended 
precisely to forestall any such effort. “Those who study the social behaviour of apes”, he continued 
in his characteristically dry fashion, “in the belief that they are significantly helping in the provision 
of data that will allow of the better ordering of human society would appear to be somewhat 
mistaken”.50 If his study of the sexual power-struggles among baboons at London Zoo was intended 
to serve this end, there is a terrible irony in the fact that Zuckerman's account was so often received 
in the opposite spirit by his readers. This is registered in the postscript to the belated second edition 
of The Social Life of Monkeys and Apes (1981), in which Zuckerman attacked the ongoing misuse 
of information about the social lives of primates to provide a natural foundation for theories about 
mankind's political problems: “The proposition that the aggressive “instincts” we have inherited 
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from our primitive forebears have something to do with the control of overpopulation or possible 
nuclear war, is no more sophisticated or useful a message than was the view of Sir Arthur Keith, 
that renowned British physical anthropologist of the early half of our century, that “war is Nature's 
pruning fork” – a conclusion which he was able to reach without the benefit of the writings of latter-
day primatologists”.51  
 
This is not to say that Zuckerman denied the ferocious sexual drives displayed on Monkey Hill held 
some place in the unconscious of the human psyche. In fact, in his article on “The Biological 
Background to Human Social Behaviour”, he readily identifies with the theory, developed by Freud 
in Totem and Taboo, that “The price of our emergence as man would seem to have been the overt 
renunciation of a dominant primate impulse in the field of sex”.52 There can be no doubt that Anker 
is correct to suggest that Zuckerman believed, “Visitors at the Zoo observing the gorillas would thus 
also observe and reflect upon their own primitive desires”.53 But it should be recognised that this 
belief must have been enormously complicated by that scientist's life-long battle against those who 
made easy analogical comparisons with the ways of monkeys and apes in order to shore up their 
own theories on human society. Instead of ignoring the elements in the Gorilla House that reference 
the circus freak-show, on the basis that this format is incompatible with serious scientific objectives, 
we should recognise this aspect of the design as the fulfilment of a specific educational 
requirement. The structure would permit the public to witness “a crude picture of that social level 
from which emerged our earliest human ancestors” but, since “we have little or nothing to gain 
from watching the behaviour of animals” in seeking “a solution to our own social and political 
problems”, this engagement with the ape could only be presented as catharsis.54 A recognition of 
our functional affinities with the animal-machine in order to induce a yet more rigorous repression 
of that shared past. A repression that would re-enforce, since in Zuckerman's philosophy it 
originally constituted, the essence of our human identity. “[It is] idle to suppose that because man is 
a primate, and sub-human primates lead their lives blindly according to scales of dominance and 
submission, human beings must therefore resign themselves to an eternity of conflict over material 
things”, he insisted, on reviewing his horrific survey of sub-human social behaviour. “The price of 
our continued existence may well be further repressions of dominant impulses, and further 
developments of the operative behaviour whose beginnings can be vaguely seen in our transition 
from a simian to a human level of existence”.55      
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 The estrangement that “pulp” elements in the design of the Gorilla House effected therefore served 
an important purpose. Like much of the cinema of the period, Lubetkin’s theatre offered scope for a 
popular ritual of regression: the primitive drives that threatened civilised society were not permitted 
to fester in darkness, but were rendered safe by being brought to light. Lubetkin's Gorilla House 
rigorously asserted throughout the viewing experience the traditional Cartesian gulf between 
Human subject and the Animal object, preventing that process of “anthropomorphising” that Solly 
Zuckerman feared and wished to guard against.  
 
In Bertold Lubetkin the London Zoological Society had found exactly the right architect to respond 
to Zuckerman's concerns over how the lives of the great apes might be interpreted by an uninformed 
public. As architectural historian John Allan has observed, the theatrical approach is “readily traced 
back to Lubetkin's philosophic commitment to the rationalist ideal”.56 Allan notes that the architect 
chose to place a Corinthian capital (unearthed in the course of excavation; part of the Nashe project 
in this district during the Regency) next to the entrance like a talisman, or an embryonic caryatid. 
“For Lubetkin, even a gorilla house was not merely a machine for gorillas to live in: it was a 
declaration of human values”.57 The architect's own daughter describes this commitment rather 
more bluntly: “He believed that human reason was an irresistible force; that science would unlock 
every secret, cure every ill, and that human beings, by virtue of their rationality, were superior to all 
other forms of life”. Her father is said to have clung to these credenda “fiercely and proclaimed 
them with a passion which was anything but rational”.58 In her account of a childhood on the 
Gloucestershire farm that Lubetkin took over after retiring from the capital, Louise Kehoe relates 
how these beliefs propelled the builder of zoos into pioneering new industrial methods of farming, 
including one contraption that he called a “cattle crush” – which apparently did just what the name 
implied. “Factory farming had not then been invented, but he discovered it for himself, turning his 
architectural skills to the task of designing slat-floored prisons in which pigs and cows could be 
immobilized and forcibly, repeatedly mated to ensure the best yield of offspring with the least 
fallow time”.59 Kehoe is quick to add that Lubetkin was not unsympathetic to his animals; he could 
be kind and took great pleasure in watching their antics. But his philosophy bound him to the idea 
that the Animal is a machine, while only the Human can be said to have mind. His zoo buildings 
aggressively insist upon this fact in an era when this tenet central to the Cartesian tradition seemed 
to have been threatened by Darwinism and the discovery of the Anthropoid. As Kehoe obverses, 
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“by juxtaposing the cool, mathematical precision of pure geometric shapes – cylinders, spirals, 
ellipses, cast in thin sections of white reinforced concrete – with the lumbering gait and awkward, 
unrefined behaviour of the captive tenants, he made clowns and performers of them in spite of 
themselves”.60 The animal is held in patterns from Euclidean geometry, mapped on a Cartesian grid, 
that testify to the all-encompassing power of the rational mind. “The animals became living 
monuments to rationalism, imprisoned not so much by bars or cages, but by their intellectual 
inferiority to humankind, whose will had wrought the seamless, soaring concrete canopies that 
sheltered them”.61 
 
In many of the zoo buildings this tendency is not nearly as pronounced as Kehoe suggests and 
Lubetkin has been justly hailed for developing a new form of civic architecture that permitted 
unprecedented interactions between man and beast. But as Louis MacNeice recognised, on viewing 
the structure shortly after its completion, there was something excessive in the Gorilla House's 
formal emphasis on circulation and control.   
 
 Beyond the Elephant House is one of the very newest and grandest of the Zoo buildings, the 
 circular gorilla House of white concrete [...] by Messers. Tecton. This is all gadgets, central 
 heating, coddling and slickness, and, like all this firm's designs, is, aesthetically, a trifle 
 frigid. We must, of course, always plump for the animal's health and comfort rather than for 
 our own, probably sentimental, certainly irrelevant, delight in a more homely and cowshed 
 atmosphere, but all the same we may remember that Alfred, the Bristol gorilla [...] has lived 
 in perfect health for years in much more primitive quarters without any of this air-
 conditioning or up-to-the-minute setting. And we may remember that Americans, with all 
 their science-in-the-home and centrally heated houses, beat the world when it comes to 
 catching colds.62 
 
Ostensibly there to protect the gorillas from air-borne infection and a northern climate to which they 
were not adapted, the obtrusive nature of the systems for air-conditioning, running water, sliding 
dust-screen, revolving sun-room, are said to represent an unwarranted thoroughness of treatment. In 
point of fact, these elements seem to have been lifted from the design for a Tuberculosis Clinic that 
was never eventually built.63 When the care taken over the formal integration of measures for the 
flow of human traffic through the building is also taken into account it becomes evident these 
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systems were not in place merely for the sake of the gorillas, but were part of a wider preoccupation 
on the part of the architect with the aesthetics of circulation and control. “In the new house the 
audience is encouraged to keep moving: porches, entrances and public spaces are designed to give 
directions to the visitor and to propel him forward”, runs a contemporary report in the journal for 
Architectural Designs and Construction, June 1933. “The old game of discovering family 
likenesses at the Zoo is, therefore, discouraged”.64 This attention to the structure's formal emphasis 
upon movement is also evident in the film on the modernist architecture at London and Whipsnade 
by Lazlo Maholy-Nagy, referred to in earlier in this article, in which a series of simple animations 
highlight the kinetic properties of the Gorilla House and Penguin Pool. Significantly, the treatment 
of the two gorillas in this motion picture differs considerably from that accorded the other zoo 
animals; while giraffes and penguins are captured rushing through their new enclosures, in shots 
that convey an exhilarating sensation of freedom and speed, the gorillas alone do not move, but 
cling and stare as the building itself moves about them. The freedom of movement celebrated in this 
section of the film is not proper to the gorillas, but a property of the machine they inhabit; while the 
other structures suggest movement, only the Gorilla House is a moving object; while the rest seem 
to inspire a delight in movement on the part of the animals, the Gorilla House reduces the apes it 
contains to passive spectators. 
 
The architect's preoccupation with a systematic regulation of circulation is a striking manifestation 
of a concept that has been a characteristic element in European thought since the Enlightenment: the 
metaphor of circulation. As David Trotter has shown in his book on this subject, over the course of 
the eighteenth and nineteenth century this concept, initially derived from medicine, became an all-
encompassing metaphor that politicians, economists, urban planners, philosophers and 
philanthropists applied to an extraordinary range of different problems, enabling them to formulate 
and install those systems that our technological, highly-populated and urbanised civilisation now 
depends upon.65 ‘The formula is as simple as can be’, remarks Wolfgang Schivelbusch: ‘whatever 
was part of circulation was regarded as healthy, progressive, constructive; all that was detached 
from circulation, on the other hand, appeared diseased, medieval, subversive, threatening’.66 It 
should come as no surprise that we should find Zuckerman struggling for this word in the thirties 
when he came to define the essence of culture, that which sets us apart from the rest of the animal 
world: “By virtue of the tools we construct, we organize our lives to a large extent according to 
                                                 
64 Anon., Archit. Designs and Construction (June 1933), pp.316-318. 
65  David Trotter, Circulation: Defoe, Dickens, and the Economics of the Novel (Basingstoke, Hampshire: Macmillan, 
1988), p.67. 
66 Wolfgang Schivelbusch, The Railway Journey: The Industrialization of Time and Space in the Nineteenth Century 
(Leamington Spa: Berg Publishers, 1986), p.195.  
means of production and exchange”, he claimed.67 And Zuckerman expressed this idea more 
stridently in later years, having talked with Lévi-Strauss: “I believe Lévi-Strauss to be right when he 
makes the point that “humanization” implies a synthesis of a number of cultural elements (among 
which exchange is critical) which, as it were, became combined in a flash” (my italics).68 No less 
than the Corinthian capital set up at the entrance, Lubtkin's formal emphasis on circulation is an 
emphatic expression, not merely of western civilisation, but of “human” values, as formulated in the 
Enlightenment. The animal that might have successfully aped our human capacity to respond is held 
immobile in the midst of systems for the circulation of light, water, air, heat and the crowd, 
powerless within a cultural paradigm that had become the entelechy of that Logos proper to man. 
No longer free to say “I am”, but bound within a fearsome structure of thought, the inmates are 
given space to play only at being what we think of as gorilla: in this instance, as has been suggested, 
the embodiment of a peculiarly human quality, a culturally specific notion of the bestiality of the Id. 
Mok and Moina were in one sense dead on the moment of arrival; they could only ever have been 
experienced as human artefacts, in the House of Light. 
 
In closing this section I would like to indicate that the formal procedures employed in the Tecton 
Gorilla House are by no means unique, but might well reflect a more general tendency in that phase 
of theory and practice to which the term Modernist is applied. To demonstrate this effectively would 
require more space than is here available. But an examination of an extract from a monumental 
work of literary modernism may serve to show that the aggressive procedures set out in this essay 
can cast light on analogous structures in material by modernist writers and artists, thereby 
contributing to the ground-breaking work currently being conducted on   the Modernist Animal by 
Carrie Rohman and Carey Wolfe.69 Published a year after the completion of the Gorilla House at 
London Zoo, the passage of poetry at the start of this essay, the translation of the Punic Periplus of 
Hanno the Navigator, is in fact a component in The Cantos of Ezra Pound, one of the largest 
fragments in that monster mosaic inspired by the glittering canopy of the Galla Placidia, Ravenna: 
the circle of gold in the gloom that gathers the light against it. Hanno's gorillas are one luminous 
detail in Pound's epic poem. They too have been enclosed in a house of light. Having studied the 
role that these apes were compelled to perform in a contemporaneous modernist structure, we are 
now in a position to contend that, though overlooked by previous commentators on Canto XL, the 
gorillas represent a discourse central to a full understanding of the themes developed in that text.  
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Critics have noted that the financial conspiracies, war-profiteering and institutionalized swindling 
that occupy the poet's attention in the first part of the canto are counterpointed by Hanno's periplus; 
that is to say, “a journey not by fixed charts or stars, but by intuition and reason; not by plotting a 
course ahead on paper, but by looking directly at what is in front of you and acting accordingly”.70 
Or as Pound himself puts it in Canto LIX: “periplum, not as land looks on a map / but as sea bord 
seen by men sailing.”71 In contrast to the destructive activities of the war-profiteers we are 
presented with the exemplary account of a ancient voyage of discovery that represents a valuable 
contribution to human knowledge. An equivalent to Pound's project in fact, the periplus is a 
recurring motif in The Cantos.72  
 
But there is mystery and speculation surrounding Hanno's account, of which Ezra Pound cannot 
have been unaware. As B.H. Warmington noted in 1964, a whole literature of scholarship had 
grown up round the report: he explains that “From everything we know about Carthaginian practice, 
the resolute determination to keep all knowledge of and access to the western markets from the 
Greeks, it is incredible that they would have allowed the publication of an accurate description of 
the voyage for all to read”.73 The interest of Hanno's Periplus resides not so much in what has been 
recorded as in what has been omitted – that which the Cartheginians were looking for in Senegal 
(Sene Khole: river of gold). “The very purpose of the voyage, the consolidation of the route to the 
gold market, is not even mentioned”.74 The significance of this omission is signalled in Pound's 
translation by a capital mid-sentence, at the point the Carthaginian ships mysteriously turn back on 
themselves, presumably to deposit their newly-acquired cargo, before proceeding into the unknown: 
“Next is a river wide, full of water / crocodiles, river horses, Thence we turned back to Cyrne / for 
12 days coasted the shore / Aethiops fled at our coming / Our Lixtae cd. not understand them.”75 
The possibility so unlikely in the first half of the canto has been realised in the second. “If a nation 
will master its money”, the poet sighed, and in this object-lesson from the past, Pound has shown 
how this was once achieved. The periplus is an emblem of a Latin motto cited at the start of Eleven 
New Cantos (1934) – “Tempus loquendi / Tempus tacendi.”76 – The report is a public secret that 
enables the State to maintain an absolute control over the medium of exchange and the circulation 
of wealth.   
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Privateers have been forestalled by a political expedient on the part of the Prince. Given the extent 
to which the gorilla in this period represented precisely that blurring of ontological categories that 
Pound execrated elsewhere in The Cantos, their violent treatment must represent a triumph over that 
error. Throughout that poem “obstructors of knowledge, / obstructors of distribution” are associated 
with types of animal, and the evil of usura, “corrupter of all things”, cutting loose the signifier from 
the signified, is represented as Satan-Geryon, or Neschek – that is to say, as irredeemably hybrid.77   
In Pound's vision the achievement of earthly harmony is inextricably bound up with the extirpation 
of the bestial: “The fourth; the dimension of stillness” requires one to exercise “the power over wild 
beasts”.78 The first recorded encounter with the gorilla is therefore re-enacted to serve a definite 
purpose. The species that was the embodiment of that lack of “clear demarcation”, hated by Pound, 
is emptied of being.79 “Killed, flayed, brought back their pelts to Carthage”.80 According to 
Roman historian Pliny, the Prince “placed the skins of two of these females in the temple of Juno, 
which were to be seen until the capture of Carthage”.81 Like Mok and Moina, the gorillas in Pound's 
Canto are put on public display, a necessary sacrifice to that regulation of circulation that constitutes 
the basis for the culture celebrated and signified by the House of Light. An image of this radiant 
temple, to which these artefacts are dedicated, concludes Canto XL.    
 
 To the high air, to the stratosphere, to the imperial 
 calm, to the empyrean, to the baily of the four towers 
 the NOUS, the ineffable crystal: 
 Karxedonion Basileos 
  hung this with his map in their temple.82  
 
In closing, I want to suggest that the subsequent application of Lubetkin's Cartesian architecture to 
the human environment ultimately constituted a form of subtle violence inflicted upon the concept 
of the Human Being – by that concept and in the name of that concept – in the act of naming that 
concept. In a final twist, the working-class visitors who flocked to see the gorillas in the house of 
light had encountered a foreshadowing of their own alienation. As John Berger pointed out in 1977, 
in the post-war era people would perceive in captive animals (in spite of Zuckerman's efforts) a 
template that might “help us to understand, accept and overcome the stresses involved in living in 
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consumer societies”.83  
 
Though many post-war modernist housing-projects were lovingly created they are undeniably 
totalitarian environments. Everything is worked out, either for good or ill, by the architect. Like the 
animals in London Zoo, the inhabitants occupy a space that leaves nothing open to chance or 
change, but which have built specifically in order to foster what the architect perceived to be the 
essential characteristic of human being: a capacity for rational thought. In at last realising on that 
basis the complete separation of our species from every other animal on the planet, many 
inhabitants of the post-war New Reality soon found themselves physically trapped in a habit of 
thought, one that has often produced remarkable results, but which is still very much a habit, merely 
one way of thinking, crippling our personal capacity for re-creation. An architect might create 
spaces for play in the most successful complexes, as in Le Corbusier's Unite de Habitation in 
Marseilles, but even a playful totalitarian space leaves no space for that re-creation, the reinvention 
of the self, that is be all and end all of recreation. The architect may have been in a playful mood, 
but the occupant is not free to say “I am” or “I will be”.  
 
In such total environments, with no outlet for creative participation, residents are deprived of a 
capacity which has been thought of as proper to mankind – but which can be shown to belong in 
some measure to every living thing. As Charles Darwin pointed out birds, for instance, in choosing 
a mate, will select that bird with the plumage they find most appealing; over time such choices will 
transform the secondary sexual characteristics of any given species.84 This observation is 
vertiginous because in a mere paragraph Darwin has shown how other species can be said to 
respond – to say what they are or what they will be – to modify and enrich their world.   
 
In short, the modernist urban-planning initiated in the United Kingdom by Lubetkin's Gorilla House 
propelled us into a new phase in our thinking regarding “the Animal”. We had imposed on our own 
species that passivity which has throughout recorded history been entailed upon “the Animal”, and 
had done so in the very act of rendering that difference absolute. In moving beyond that shared 
tragedy, the recognition of this capacity for self-creation is providing the basis for the participatory 
practices currently being introduced in both zoos and the human environment. Far from eliminating 
the differences between humans and animals (as in well intentioned, but flawed, attempts to extend 
Human Rights to other species, this post-modernist approach provides scope for the multiplication 
of differance; “the frontier no longer forms a single indivisible line but more than one internally 
                                                 
83 John Berger, Why Look at Animals? (London: Penguin, 2009), p.36. 
84 Darwin, p.687. 
divided line . . . the edges of a limit that grows and multiplies by feeding on an abyss”.85    
 
                                                 
85 Derrida, p.31. 
